The problematic and shifting nature of selfhood and subjectivity came to dominate intellectual and cultural dis cussion in the postwar years. The "relation of the self to culture rather than to society," as Lionel Trilling described it, cap tured a shift among many intellectuals away from political and social analysis to an abiding concern with culture, alien ation, and identityl The decade of the 1950s was neatly framed by the publication of David Riesman's The Lonely Crowd (1950), with its deep ambivalence about the change from an inner-to an other-directed character type, and by Erving Goffrnan's The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (1959), where the theatricality of interpersonal relations became an object for analysis. Generally, intellectuals attempted to save the self from the ravages of a conformist consumer culture.
Although Bercovitch never trained his interpretive gU;JS on Schlesinger's text, he could easily fit it into his theory of the jeremiad. Fer The Vita! Center invokes an American mission, with WaYniflg,s agaifl~l it fall associated with simpiis tic optimism. Of course, Schlesinger's anxious liberalism, along with its hearty call for individualism and national unity against Communism, was not intended to be a conservative document. Indeed, Schlesinger asked Americans to "renew the traditional sources of American radicalism and seek out ways to maintain our belief at a high pitch of vibrations."4 But such vibrations cannot pierce ears deaf to reformism and alert only to absolute rejection of corporate liberalism. Just as Bercovitch manages to dismiss the rhetorical dissent of mid-nineteenth--<:entury American reformers, so might his words be applied to Schlesinger's ideal: it was destined to fail "because it was grounded in prescribed ritual forms [that] circum scribed the threat of basic social alternatives. It facilitated process in such a way as to enlist radicalism itself in the cause of institutional stability. "5 Here, in a nutshell, is the intellectual and political cul-de-sac in which historians of the postwar years have become trapped. Radicalism, rhetorical and otherwise, experimentalism in the arts such as abstract expressionism or Beat prosody, are found wanting, guilty of the crime of not overthrowing the consensus of corporate liberalism. That which does not end in rebellion is condemned for complicity,-ll false radicalism which itself becomes another "cause of institutional stability."
Now historians may disagree with one another about whether corporate liberalism was a Leviathan and even whether it was good or bad, but certainly they should try to comprehend the possibilities of freedom as well as contain ment in the postwar ethos. Interpretations of corporate-liberal hegemony too often reduce culture to politics, leave little room for aesthetic enjoyment, presume that corporate liberalism coopts everything, and promote an ideal of radicalism so ill-defined as to become almost meaningless. The title of Jean-Paul Sartre's play No Exit sums up the logic of the corpo rate-liberal hegemony thesis. For Bercovitch and others, there is no exit from the hegemony of corporate liberalism. While the prison that Sartre dramatized was defined by individuals' failure to take responsibility for choices, or by individuals who construct themselves inauthentically, the no-exit of these recent America critics forecloses the Sartrean emphasis on choice and leaves us with at best mildewed attempts to push against the edges of ideological consensus or futile dashes to escape cooptation.
It is with great anticipation, then, that we greet two new works promising to bring forth greater complexity of interpretation and to open up space for meaningful individual rebellion and political protest against the dark power of cor porate-liberal consensus. While Daniel Belgrad valiantly tries to demonstrate how a "culture of spontaneity" resisted the cultural power of corporate liberalism, Thomas Frank's The Conquest oJCool ends up, perhaps unintentionally, as one of the strongest statements to date of corporate-liberal hegemony. By demonstrating how a culture of cool fit the needs of both advertising and youth rebellion, Frank, like Bercovitch in his study of the jeremiad, manages to reduce the complex radicalism of the counterculture to a listless form of individual expression. Tying that radicalism to the ideological power of modem advertising, Frank presents yet another work that leaves the individual self trapped in the false freedom of con sumer culture. Belgrad begins by acknowledging the power of corporate-liberal culture in the postwar years. In a sometimes all encompassing dichotomy, Belgrad contends that corporate-liberal culture was premised upon science, rationality, empiri cism, modernity, objectivity, and a mind-body dualism. In contrast, the culture of spontaneity celebrated emotion, chance, nontraditional forms of knowledge, unmediated thought, improvisation, and mind-body holism. For Belgrad, furthermore, the "culture of spontaneity" was capable of resisting cooption and appropriation by the behemoth of corporate liberalism.
Belgrad's work is most valuable in proving that a unified, vibrant "culture of spontaneity"---<!erived from the work of Alfred North Whitehead, Carl Jung, Zen Buddhism, and other modes of thought distant from the received "Western tra- alone but also with the corporate-liberal state in America, whose conception of "normality" Goodman found to be patho logical. Goodman's solution, "Gestalt Therapy," required, as its name implies, understanding not simply the existential angst of the individual in the universe but also the interaction between social institutions and individuals and interperson al relations in general. Goodman believed that developing spontaneous awareness and freeing up reserves of energy could bring on a transformation: "Force is welling in the soul. And if we use our strength in love, there is still more strength for beautiful collaboration, and even for idiosyncratic strokes-and always we are ready to the present" (152). Such an emphasis on the present, on the body, on breaking the bonds of normalcy, and on personal interactions would constitute the essence of the culture of spontaneity as an enduring challenge to the mind-body dualism and scientific reason that pre sumably defined corporate liberalism.
As with any work of sweeping dimensions, problems certainly appear. All too often Belgrad posits overly firm lines of division between spontaneous artists and, for want of a better term, traditional "intellectual" artists. Thus in the section on painting, Belgrad ignores the work of color-field painters such as Mark Rothko, which does not fit well into either group. And Belgrad seeks to cordon off the work of Jackson Pollock from that of Willem de Kooning. The latter is found to be too much of an existentialist, thus suffering from mind-body dualism. In contrast, Pollock is the exemplar of spontaneity, subjectivity, and holism, "engaging the unconscious mind through its locus in the human body" (110). But as is evident in the recent New York Museum of Modem Art retrospective on Pollock, the artist surely engaged the con scious mind, confronting himself through the canvas, carefully refining and reworking lines after the initial explosion of energy. Belgrad's interpretation of de Kooning's "Woman" paintings as existentialist reduces their meaning to a disgust with the body, in almost the same terms that Sartre used in Nausea. One can also interpret these paintings, though, as a critique of the dominant consumer culture, parodying the mass-produced images of the alluring woman. In his discussion of existentialism and art, Belgrad goes against his own often-expressed (and correct) recognition that artists quite proper ly are eclectic in their. cultural appropriation; what they appropriate is defined less by its logical connections than by its value in the production of a particular work of art.
To a degree, Belgrad successfully fends off charges that the work of spontaneous artists contributed to the corpo rate-liberal hegemony of their day; indeed, this is one intent of his book. He accomplishes this, in part, by positing a deep chasm between the component parts ofthe corporate-liberal ideal (rationality, dualism) and the culture of spontaneity (free dom, body). Belgrad rightly resists attempts to reduce works of art to their reception rather than their creation. To do so fails to appreciate the internal logic (or emotions) or tradition within which a work either functions or rebels. But for this interpretive ploy to succeed, one first has to accept Bclgrad's definitions and oppositions. And even if one does, the coop tation thesis may still be invoked. Charles Olson's ideal of "voluminous production" and immediate perception in his poet ry may be contrary to the logic of corporate-liberal rationality, but in a sense this aesthetic of production jibes all too well with the mass consumption and surface-level ideals of corporate liberalism (31, 123). Cooption is unnecessary since the -form of expression already pre.sumes the form of reality it seeks to transcend.
The essential thesis Belgrad seeks to drive home, apart from demonstrating wonderfully the expansive and central nature of the culture of spontaneity, is how that culture's "principles ofbody-mind holism and intersubjectivity" challenged the Cold War culture (244). In his zeal to celebrate spontaneity, Belgrad sometimes reduces other artistic modes to com plicity with corporate liberalism. He fails to demonstrate why a cultural politics premised upon reason, in the work of someone like Noam Chomsky, cannot effectively challenge the presumptions to reason and objectivity that inform corpo rate liberalism. Perhaps it is too much to expect that any constellation of ideas can mount a successful offensive against such a chameleon-like and powerful opponent as the culture of corporate liberalism. But Belgrad deserves praise for his / earnest attempt to push the edges of rebellion, to respect and restore an artistic tradition of spontaneity that opposed the conformity associated with the corporate status quo.
Alas, Thomas Frank would pooh pooh the notion that a culture of spontaneity in any way challenged the hegemo ny of corporate liberalism. For Frank, spontaneity, creativity, and improvisation became the trademarks that defined adver tising, the battering ram of corporate-liberal ideology in the 1960s. As Frank would have it, the cultural radicals of "spon taneity" and the radicals of advertising were all drinking from the same well of creative freedom and personal liberation. Moreover, the very critique of the advertising world became part of advertising copy, a form of counter-advertising that defined the famous Volkswagen campaign of the early 1960s undertaken by the Doyle Dane Bernbach agency. The
Volkswagen was touted for the very product qualities that advertising agencies had previously rejected: its rather pedestri an but practical qualities. And, in time, the Volkswagen campaign became joined to the youth movement, as that auto mobile emerged as the vehicle of choice for a generation of consumers that did not want to appear to be conformist con sumers.
Here we begin to see problems with Frank's often glib analysis, with his connection of rebellion to consumption.
Consider more fully the case of the Volkswagen. First, Frank reduces the 1960s to its symbols without understanding the reality, never fully controlled by advertising gurus, that lay behind those symbols. The Volkswagen became the car of choice for many young people because it had real assets: it got better mileage than any other car on the market at the time, it was easy to repair, relatively inexpensive, and its size fit well with the counterculture ideology of "small is beautiful."
Thus Frank, in his enthusiasm to merge the counterculture with the presumptions of advertising, elides the reasoning process of the consumers, thus leaving out at least half of the equation.
Frank's book drips with wonderfully understated comic irony and earnestness. He begins by taking seriously the internal history of advertising and the heady enthusiasm of advertisers for the style and substance of cool, hip, and youth.
By the early 1960s, according to Frank, chaotic management, absolute creative freedom, and an attitude of rebellion char acterized leading advertising agencies. At times, in his lively prose, Frank seems to suggest that this revolution was val ued in and of itself, quite apart from any particular success in selling products. Sincerity rather than cooptation defined the introduction of hip into the world of advertising. "American advertising took the side it did during the cultural revo lution of the 1960s not simply because it wanted to sell a particular demographic, but because it found great promise in the new values of the counterculture" (123). Youth culture, in this equation, was a perfect vehicle for the advertising execu tive to gain greater freedom and a boon for a new generation to think itself free of the conformity of consumption, while busily consuming goods packaged in the language of hip. clothing----came to be confused, came to be coordinate, with the very act of rebellion.
In recent years some cultural theorists have attempted to celebrate the phenomenon of consumption as rebellion.
Here the act of immediate gratification, of window shopping, of dreaming of freedom through the purchase of products, is transformed into a behind-the-scenes critique of an aesthetic of limits, a rejection of the Protestant ideal of denial. In the intriguing work of French theorist Gilles Lipovetsky, fashion, the "reign of the ephemeral," becomes a means of demo cratic possibility and an inherent critique of all systems of domination based upon denial and limitation of choices. The motor of history, in this view, is the power of the individual to navigate and create identity and self through fashion. 6 In essence, to accessorize is to be free.
Frank does not fall for this siren song of fashion. While he is well attuned to the advertisers' heartfelt turn to hip, he turns a deaf ear to its seductive promise of genuine freedom. On the other hand, however, his critique of false freedom makes a caricature of the counterculture. The generation of the 1960s, while prone to misinterpretation, excess, and con sumerism, was also capable of concerted political activity, evolving commitments against racism, sexism, and imperialism.
Rather than simply opening up the world to sybaritic excess, as some conservatives have it, radicals of the 1960s actually helped create a culture that meaningfully challenged (even if it could not overthrow) many presumptions of corporate lib eralism.
Both of these works can yield a pessimistic reading. Belgrad's culture of spontaneity appears to have made few dents in the armor of corporate liberalism. Moreover, as Frank indicates, the culture of spontaneity, growing out of the cri tique of postwar conformity and scientific rationalism, became the very language for advertising and, in turn, for the health of the state. While paragons of the Left and the Right may coalesce in their condemnations of the excesses of the 1960s, the corporate-liberal state and advertising's lively investment in a hip style associated with that period of rebellion is pre dominant at this time and shows no signs of weakening. Nonetheless, there is an appealing enthusiasm in Frank's writing that suggests we are not totally bereft of possi bilities. His vibrant diatribes against corporate culture are valuable. 7 Indeed, lifestyle changes are not the ground upon __whIch to do battle with corporate culture. But where and how is the battle to be joined, especially if we reject the thesis that corporate hegemony is everywhere, even in the sinews of protest? If it is everywhere, then resistance is impossible if not absurd. We are in a world without exit.
One mode of resistance against corporate hegemony and advertising enticements is a rigorous intellectual life. Such a life, by defmition, chafes against consumerism and fashionable discourse. The rigor and complexity of the post war New York intellectuals, for instance, was impressive and valuable-even though they became absurd when an intel lectual hardening of the arteries kept them from recognizing the best in the culture of spontaneity and popular culture. A rigorous critical disposition, towards both the culture at large and one's own ideas, holds itself up as a form of resistance I in an age of information and advertising, where everything seems cheap and ubiquitous, predigested and phony. Modem Jeremiahs of the mind may not lead us out of the desert that Frank surveys, but they may point us resolutely toward exits leading to a better place.
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